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Abstract: Non-reductive physicalism is commonly understood as the view that mental properties are 
realized by physical properties. Here, I argue that the realization relation in question is a power 
inheritance relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are a subset 
of the causal powers of P. Whereas others have motivated this claim by appealing to its theoretical 
benefits, I argue that it is in fact entailed by two theses: (i) realization is a same-subject necessitation 
relation; (ii) properties have their causal powers derivatively on the causal powers of their bearers. 
Although the power inheritance claim that is defended here has many opponents, I take it that the 
two theses that entail it are either plausible or widely assumed. 
I 
It is commonplace to take non-reductive physicalism (NRP) to be a realization thesis. 
According to this understanding, NRP is the view that mental properties are not identical 
with, but are realized by, physical properties, where realization is a relation whose exact 
formulation is up for discussion.
2
 Here, I shall argue that the following principle is true for 
the realization relation: if a property P realizes a property Q, then the causal powers of Q are 
a subset of the causal powers of P.
3
 Let us call this principle Power Inheritance (PI). Jessica 
Wilson (1999; 2011; 2015), Lenny Clapp (2001) and Sydney Shoemaker (2001; 2007)
4
 argue 
for PI on the grounds that it has certain theoretical benefits. Each provides a distinctive way 
of explaining how PI is meant to show that NRP doesn’t imply that mental properties are 
causally excluded by their physical realizers. Moreover, Wilson holds that PI ensures the 
physicalist contention that ‘mental properties are “nothing over and above” their base 
properties’ (1999: 41). In what follows, I provide a new argument for PI which doesn’t 
appeal to its alleged theoretical benefits, thanks to which I am hoping to sidestep the issues 
related to the ‘nothing over and above’ locution and the success of the proposed solutions to 
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 Such realization-based formulations of physicalism can be found in Boyd (1980) Poland (1994), Wilson 
(1999), Melnyk (2003) and Shoemaker (2007). See Baysan (2015) for a review of some of these 
formulations. 
3
 This subset condition is not a sufficient condition for realization. There could be pairs of properties which 
satisfy the subset condition but are not related via realization. As noted by Wilson (1999) and Shoemaker 
(2001), a conjunctive property (P & Q) would have P’s causal powers as a subset, but in general, 
conjunctive properties are not realizers of their conjuncts.  
4
 All of these philosophers argue that the said subset condition is in fact a proper subset condition. Despite 
my agreement, here I shall only argue for PI, leaving it open whether the subset relation is a proper or an 
improper one. An ancestor of PI is Kim’s causal inheritance principle, which suggests that ‘if mental 
property M is realized in a system at t in virtue of physical realization base P, the causal powers of this 
instance of M are identical with the causal powers of P’ (1992: 18). Kim uses this principle in an argument 
against NRP, aiming to show that the principle leads to a reductive view, not a non-reductive one. So it is 
plausible to interpret Kim to be making an improper subset claim. 
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the causal exclusion problem.
5
 Admittedly, PI is controversial; many have rejected it for 
reasons independently of the issues that are related to the causal exclusion debate (e.g. 
Noordhof 1997; 1999; 2013; Gillett 2002; 2003; 2010; Pereboom 2002; 2011; Menzies & 
List 2010). Interestingly, despite its controversial status, PI is in fact a consequence of two 
claims which are either plausible or widely assumed. Or so I shall argue. 
II 
The argument that I shall present for PI is motivated by physicalism’s commitment to the 
supervenience of the mental on the physical. Much ink has been spilled over identifying the 
right variety of supervenience that physicalism should be committed to. One proposal is that 
a variety of strong supervenience in Kim’s (1984) sense is a better candidate than other 
varieties of supervenience. If this is right, then such supervenience entails that (i) one cannot 
have a mental property without thereby having some physical property, and (ii) a mental 
property M is necessitated by any physical property P that M supervenes on. The definition of 
strong supervenience is silent about the modal strength of necessitation. There is a plausible 
argument that physicalists should appeal to metaphysical necessitation, not merely 
nomological necessitation, as otherwise their views wouldn’t be distinguishable from some 
anti-physicalist views (Noordhof 2003).
6
 Despite my agreement, I will not be committed to 
this latter claim about metaphysical necessitation and will stick to the following conditional: 
if physicalism is true, then mental properties are at least nomologically necessitated by 
physical properties. Given that realization is the relation that relates mental properties to 
physical properties according to NRP, the following is a very plausible claim: 
(1) If a property P realizes a property Q, then, as a matter of nomological necessity, all 
bearers of P are also bearers of Q.
7
 
Let’s now introduce a putative case of realization: 
(2) The property of having C-fibre stimulation realizes the property of having pain.8  
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 An anonymous referee points out that there are implausible consequences of PI regarding mental 
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From (1) and (2), it follows that 
(3) as a matter of nomological necessity, all bearers of C-fibre stimulation are also 
bearers of pain. 
A few words regarding (3) are in order. Due to massive oversimplifications, (3) is obviously 
false. As Shoemaker (1981) illustrates, C-fibre stimulation in a Petri dish will not bring about 
an instantiation of pain. So, a Petri dish, or the stuff in the dish, can be a bearer of C-fibre 
stimulation without thereby being a bearer of pain, even if physicalism is true.
9
 It is known 
that such difficulties can be avoided by including some background conditions in the realizer 
so that neural firings in Petri dishes wouldn’t count as appropriate realizers of mental 
properties. After all, the realizing properties can be extrinsic properties, as it can also be 
acknowledged due to the observation that mental content can be ‘wide’. If one wishes to 
formulate physicalism without reference to such extrinsic properties, it is possible to do so in 
terms of a ‘global’ supervenience thesis. However, the point that I am making here is easier 
to express in terms of ‘local’ supervenience, so I shall allow realizer properties to include 
such extrinsic properties, if needed. 
The illustration of the next step for the argument that I am presenting here needs some scene-
setting. The question that is relevant here is this. What do we mean when we attribute causal 
powers to properties? Consider a variation of an example from Shoemaker (1980). Being 
knife-shaped has the power to cut bread---conditionally on being instantiated with certain 
other properties, of course. When we attribute this power to the property of being knife-
shaped, do we really mean that the property itself has this power? Unless we want to identify 
properties with bundles of causal powers, I don’t think that we have any good reason to give 
an affirmative answer to this question. Properties don’t cut bread. Their bearers might. To 
generalise, properties don’t (literally or fundamentally) have causal powers; their bearers do. 
If one chooses to analyse causal power attributions to properties in terms of causal power 
attributions to their bearers, then it might appear that the next question to answer is: In virtue 
of what do objects have causal powers? In other words, what are the truthmakers of true 
dispositional statements? When I truly say that a glass is fragile, what makes this fragility-
ascription true? This is a notoriously tricky issue to settle. Luckily, the argument that I am 
presenting for PI doesn’t depend on how to settle it. Whatever the correct account of 
dispositional attributions to objects is, we can take that account and then derive the correct 
account of causal power attributions to properties. 
If we are to explain the causal powers of properties in terms of the causal powers of their 
bearers, then we ought to find a systematic way of doing so. One option would be to hold the 
following thesis: 
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(4a) A property P has, among its causal powers, a causal power C just in case all bearers 
of P have C. 
Although (4a) is a relatively good approximation, there are some problems with it. One 
counterexample will suffice. Suppose that all yellow things in a world w are destroyed, 
except one mustard bottle. (Assume that mustard is not yellow in w.) If (4a) were true, it 
would have been the case that, in w, the property of being yellow has the causal power to 
squirt mustard. But this is surely very odd.
10
 One way of getting round this problem would be 
by means of introducing a modal element in the formulation: 
(4b) A property P has, among its causal powers, a causal power C just in case, necessarily, 
all bearers of P have C. 
Some philosophers will find the right-hand side of (4b) too strong---if the necessity in 
question is to be understood as metaphysical necessity. Particularly, there is the worry that 
(4b) might commit us to what is sometimes called dispositionalism, namely the view that 
properties have their causal profiles as a matter of metaphysical necessity, which is meant to 
suggest that a property confers on its bearers the same causal powers in all possible worlds.
11
 
Whether dispositionalism is true or not is disputable, and the argument for PI shouldn’t be 
dependent on this.
12
 One obvious fix would be to relativise the strength of the modal operator 
to nomologically possible worlds. 
(4c) A property P has, among its causal powers, a causal power C just in case, as a matter 
of nomological necessity, all bearers of P have C. 
The latter provides a systematic way of explaining how a given property can be assigned a 
causal profile. Moreover, it has certain advantages over other alternatives: there are no 
obvious counterexamples to it; it is not committed to metaphysically loaded theses; and, more 
importantly, it is compromising enough to accommodate metaphysically loaded theses. For 
example, if one holds that nomologically possible worlds and metaphysically possible worlds 
are co-extensional, then she can still hold (4c). In that case, (4b) and (4c) would be 
equivalent, but then there wouldn’t be any problem with being committed to dispositionalism, 
as dispositionalists typically reject the nomological-metaphysical distinction, due to their 
belief that laws of nature hold non-contingently.
13
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 Menzies & List (2010), who disagree with the PI, wouldn’t be happy with (4c), or any of its variations I 
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It might be objected that (4c) rules out the nomological possibility of epiphenomenal 
properties. An epiphenomenal property, by definition, doesn’t have any causal powers, but it 
seems to be possible that all bearers of an epiphenomenal property may have some causal 
powers in common---due to sharing some other properties. So, one qualification that we 
might want to add to (4c) would be to restrict it to only non-epiphenomenal properties. This 
qualification should be unproblematic for the intended conclusion, as the argument that I am 
presenting is for a thesis about properties with causal powers.
 
 
Now, consider the following platitude: pain experiences dispose their subjects to cry. Some 
pain subjects might not manifest their dispositions to cry for whatever reason---they might be 
superspartans---but being disposed to cry is the right sort of disposition to associate with pain 
experiences. Hence, 
(5) pain has, among its causal powers, the causal power to cry. 
Now, from (4c) and (5), it follows that 
(6) as a matter of nomological necessity, all bearers of pain have the causal power to cry. 
Now, remember from (3) that all bearers of C-fibre stimulation are, as a matter of 
nomological necessity, bearers of pain. Then, (3) and (6) yield the following. 
(7) As a matter of nomological necessity, all bearers of C-fibre stimulation have the causal 
power to cry. 
Recall (4c), which links causal powers of properties to causal powers of their bearers. From 
(4c) and (7), we obtain: 
(8) C-fibre stimulation has, among its causal powers, the causal power to cry.
14
 
What does (1)-(8) show? It shows that PI is true. Let me explain why. We see that an 
arbitrarily chosen causal power of pain turns out to be also a causal power of C-fibre 
                                                                                                                                                        
is responsible for the occurrence of E should be a causal power of both M and N. But Menzies and List 
suggest that this is not the case because N is not a legitimate, proportional, cause of E. Therefore, PI is 
false. Or so they argue. That N is not a legitimate cause of E falls out of their understanding of causation as 
a difference-making relation. Given that they have a difference-making approach to causation, it isn’t very 
surprising that they wouldn’t be on board with the suggestions I have made regarding (4c) above. 
However, as an anonymous referee points out, their objection is unsuccessful on other grounds too. It 
appears that they conflate the question of whether N is a legitimate (proportional) cause of B with the 
question of whether N confers on its bearers a causal power whose manifestations can be events like B. 
After all, N and M might confer the same given causal power on their bearers, yet only one’s doing so 
could be counted as an instance of proportional causation. 
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 This conclusion shouldn’t be conflated with the following statement: C-fibre stimulation confers the 
causal power to cry on all bearers of pain. This latter statement is false, as there can be bearers of pain 
which aren’t bearers of C-fibre stimulation. One person who disagrees with PI is Noordhof (1997; 1999; 
2013), whose objection turns out to target this latter statement, which I take to be false. He argues that C-
fibre stimulation doesn’t have all causal powers of pain. His reason is that whereas pain confers some 
powers on, say, robots, C-fibre stimulation doesn’t. What (8) in my argument says is that the causal power 
to cry is conferred on all bearers of C-fibre stimulation, not that C-fibre stimulation confers this power on 
objects which are not its bearers. 
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stimulation. But note that the properties C-fibre stimulation and pain are arbitrarily chosen 
too, apart from the fact that they are related via the realization relation. From what has been 
argued for, it follows that, for any two properties P and Q, if P is a realizer of Q, then any 
causal power that is attributed to Q should also be attributed to P. In other words, the causal 
powers of Q are a subset of the causal powers of P. 
III 
The argument I have just presented shows that PI is a consequence of two theses: (i) 
realization is a same-subject necessitation relation with at least nomological strength; (ii) the 
causal powers of a property should be understood in terms of the causal powers of its bearers. 
Those who question PI
15
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